This paper explores for spillovers from monetary policy in the United States to a number of emerging market economies. We estimate the Elder and Serletis (2010) bivariate structural GARCH-in-Mean VAR in the U.S. monetary policy rate and the policy rate of each of six emerging economies that target the in ‡ation rate -Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and South Africa. We also estimate the same model in the U.S. monetary policy rate and the exchange rate (against the U.S. dollar) of each of six emerging economies that target the exchange rate -Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Comoros, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro. Our evidence suggests that positive (negative) U.S. monetary policy shocks tend to appreciate (depreciate) the currencies of the exchange rate targeting emerging economies, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the policy rates of the in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies. Moreover, monetary policy uncertainty in the United States leads to an increase in policy rates in those emerging economies that target the in ‡ation rate and to a depreciation of the currencies of those emerging economies that target the exchange rate.
Introduction
Monetary policy in the United States, and the role of the U.S. dollar as an international currency, play an important role in determining global …nancial conditions. As Edwards (2018, p. 85) put it, "even under ‡exible exchange rates, there is signi…cant policy interconnectedness across countries. In a highly globalized setting, even when there are no obvious traditional reasons for raising interest rates, some central banks will follow the Fed. This phenomenon may be called 'policy spillover,'and could be the result of a number of factors, including the desire by central banks to protect domestic currencies from 'excessive'volatility. If this is indeed the case, then even under ‡exible exchange rates there is no such a thing as true 'monetary independence.' " Motivated by these considerations, in this paper we explore for spillovers from monetary policy in the United States to a number of emerging market countries. These economies are becoming extremely relevant for global economic growth, as they account for about 70 percent of global growth in output and consumption, and as Serletis and Azad (2018) recently put it in the Conclusion, "the growth prospects of emerging market economies are becoming extremely relevant for global economic growth. " We estimate the Elder and Serletis (2010) bivariate structural GARCH-in-Mean VAR in the U.S. monetary policy rate and the policy rate of each of six emerging economies that target the in ‡ation rate -Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and South Africa. We also estimate the same model in the U.S. monetary policy rate and the exchange rate (against the U.S. dollar) of each of six emerging economies that target the exchange rate -Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Comoros, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro. We associate the U.S. monetary policy rate VAR residual with exogenous U.S. monetary policy shocks, use the conditional standard deviation of the forecast error for the change in the U.S. monetary policy rate as a measure of monetary policy uncertainty in the United States, and investigate the relationship between the U.S. monetary policy rate and the policy stance in each of the emerging economies.
We estimate the structural (identi…ed) GARCH-in-Mean VAR using full information maximum likelihood, avoiding Pagan's (1984) generated regressor problems associated with estimating the variance equation separately from the conditional mean equation. We use monthly data and two new data sets, recently compiled by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) -one on monetary policy rates (for 38 countries) and one on exchange rates (for 190 countries). We investigate the e¤ects of positive and negative U.S. monetary policy shocks, and also whether monetary policy uncertainty in the United States has had statistically signi…cant spillover e¤ects on each of the emerging economies. Our evidence suggests that positive (negative) U.S. monetary policy shocks tend to appreciate (depreciate) the currencies of the exchange rate targeting emerging economies, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the policy rates of the in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies, and that monetary policy uncertainty in the United States leads to an increase in policy rates in those emerging economies that target the in ‡ation rate and leads to depreciation of the currencies of those emerging economies that target the exchange rate.
The paper contributes in two ways to the existing literature. First, the paper uses two novel data sets, recently made available by the Bank for International Settlements, to investigate for monetary policy spillovers from U.S. monetary policy to in ‡ation targeting and exchange rate targeting emerging economies. The second contribution to the existing empirical literature is that the paper provides an empirical investigation of the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting hypothesis in the context of emerging economies. In this regard, most of the existing studies investigate the overshooting hypothesis in the context of advanced economies, as in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) , and very few studies have been conducted in the context of emerging economies. Our paper investigates the overshooting hypothesis in the context of the United States economy, where the response of the U.S. dollar against the currencies of six exchange rate targeting emerging economies is investigated due to a monetary policy shock in the United States.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses monetary policy strategies for emerging market economies, in particular, exchange rate targeting and in ‡ation targeting. Section 3 presents the data and discusses their time series properties using unit root and stationarity tests. In Section 4, we brie ‡y explain the Elder and Serletis (2010) empirical model while in Section 5 we present and discuss the empirical results. The last section brie ‡y concludes the paper.
Nominal Targets for Monetary Policy
What economic variable should serve as the nominal anchor? There are several monetary policy strategies that could be used to promote price stability, including the money supply, the exchange rate, the in ‡ation rate, the price level, and nominal GDP. In what follows we brie ‡y discuss exchange rate targeting and in ‡ation targeting. In this regard, after the abandonment of monetarism in the early 1980s by the Federal Reserve in the United States and other industrialized countries around the world, because of unstable money demand functions (due to velocity shocks), between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, the dominant approach for many developing countries to lower in ‡ation rates was the use of the exchange rate as the monetary policy target. In recent years, however, a large number of emerging and developing economies started targeting the in ‡ation rate and have given their central banks greater independence, following the success of in ‡ation targeting in advance economies, such as New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Exchange Rate Targeting
As already noted, a monetary policy strategy that could be used to promote price stability is exchange rate targeting (also refered to as an exchange rate peg). It involves …xing the value of the domestic currency to that of a large, low-in ‡ation country (the anchor country). It requires an easing of monetary policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to appreciate and a tightening of monetary policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to depreciate. It has the advantage of increasing international trade and investment by reducing transaction costs and exchange risk and by preventing speculative bubbles. Moreover, if the nominal anchor of an exchange rate target is credible (i.e., expected to be adhered to), it helps mitigate the time inconsistency problem associated with rule type monetary policy making.
Exchange rate targeting, however, requires giving up an independent monetary policy. For example, the central bank of the targeting country cannot use monetary easing (increase the money supply, reduce interest rates, or devalue its currency), in response to domestic bad shocks. Also, under exchange rate targeting, shocks to the anchor country are directly transmitted to the pegging country, and so changes in interest rates and the in ‡ation rate in the anchor country lead to corresponding changes in interest rates and the in ‡ation rate in the targeting country. Another problem with exchange rate targeting is that it leaves the targeting country open to speculative attacks on its currency. For example, if the anchor country is practicing tight monetary policy, the pegging country is subjected to a negative demand shock that leads to a decline in economic activity. If speculators reason that the pegging country will not tolerate the decline in economic activity and start to question its commitment to the exchange rate peg, there could be speculative attacks on the pegging country that can lead to full-scale …nancial crises (examples are the speculative attacks to the European ERM countries in September 1992, Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, and Argentina in 2002).
Over the years, exchange rate targeting has been e¤ective in controlling in ‡ation in both industrialized countries as well as in emerging market economies. However, the emerging market currency crises that started in the early 1990s and ended in the early 2000s, all involved the abandonment of exchange rate targeting. In many countries (including Mexico and Argentina), this happened because of speculative attacks that led to gradual but sustained losses of international reserves, and so forced the abandonment of exchange rate anchors. Other countries such as, for example, Chile and Colombia, preemptively switched to ‡oating exchange rates. Also, some smaller countries responded by moving to institutionally locked-in arrangements, such as currency boards or full dollarization. In a currency board arrangement, the domestic currency is backed 100% by a foreign (reserve) currency (such as the U.S. dollar) and the exchange rate between the two currencies is …xed. A currency board is thus a variant of a …xed exchange-rate regime with an even stronger commitment mechanism, since domestic money can be issued only if it is fully backed by foreign reserves. In fact, a currency board arrangement is the modern day equivalent of a fully backed gold standard with foreign reserves taking the place of gold reserves. Currency boards have been adopted by Hong Kong (in 1983), Argentina (in 1991), and Lithuania (in 1994) with the U.S. dollar, and Estonia (in 1992), Bulgaria (in 1997), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 1999) with the euro.
Another possible exchange rate arrangement is 'dollarization'-one country's use of another country's money (which may not be the U.S. dollar). Dollarization is another variant of a …xed exchange-rate regime, with an even better commitment device than a currency board. In particular, dollarization avoids the possibility of a speculative attack on the domestic currency and also eliminates the in ‡ation-bias problem of discretionary policy (arising from attempts to stimulate the economy and incentives to monetize the public debt). However, dollarization is subject to the usual disadvantages of a …xed exchange-rate regimeit implies the loss of an independent monetary policy, the inability of the central bank to act as a lender of last resort, and the loss of seigniorage (the revenue that the government receives by issuing money). Recently, Ecuador (in 2000) and El Salvador (in 2001) adopted full dollarization.
Currency boards and dollarization, however, are strong measures that tend to be applied in extreme circumstances. They have been advocated as monetary policy strategies for emerging market countries, especially in parts of Latin America that have had a long history of monetary instability. In sum, as Frankel (2011, pp. 1457) put it, "from the longer-term perspective of the four decades since 1971, the general trend has been in favor of ‡oating exchange rates."
In ‡ation Targeting
In recent years, a large number of emerging and developing economies switched from exchange rate targeting to in ‡ation targeting, following the success of in ‡ation targeting in advanced economies. Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico switched from exchange rate pegs to in ‡ation targeting in 1999, as well as Armenia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, while they were making the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Israel, Korea, South Africa, and Thailand also switched from exchange rate targets to in ‡ation targeting about the same time. Then Mexico followed in 2001, Indonesia and Romania in 2005, and Turkey in 2006. Currently there are 66 advanced, emerging, and developing economies around the world that target the in ‡ation rate, and many other countries are moving toward this monetary policy framework.
As already noted, in ‡ation targeting has been very successful in industrialized countries. In emerging market and developing economies, however, in ‡ation targeting can be vulnerable to temporary supply (price) shocks, which tend to be larger than for advanced countries, because it builds unnecessary procyclicality into the automatic monetary mechanism. In the case, for example, of a temporary negative supply shock, short-run in ‡ation stabilization requires a signi…cant autonomous tightening of monetary policy, and leads to a larger deviation in aggregate output from potential, relative to a no policy response, with the entire fall in nominal GDP being borne by real GDP.
In this regard, it should be kept in mind that in ‡ation-targeting central banks typically target headline (based on total CPI) in ‡ation, mainly for transparency and communication reasons (i.e., the public is more likely to understand what the central bank is doing).
In ‡ation-targeting central banks also use core (or underlying) in ‡ation (the rate of in ‡ation based on core CPI that excludes food, energy, and the e¤ects of changes in indirect taxes) to "look through"temporary changes in total CPI and focus on the underlying trend of in- ‡ation. However, it has been argued that targeting headline in ‡ation (sticky price in ‡ation) leads to distortions in relative prices and less-than-full output stabilization whereas targeting core in ‡ation without sticky prices (of food and energy) is always optimal. In this regard, Pourroy et al. (2016) argue that the optimal monetary policy depends on a country's income level. In particular, headline in ‡ation targeting is optimal in low-and medium-income countries (which have a high share of food and energy goods in the consumption basket). In high-income countries, the optimal choice is core in ‡ation. Also, if the supply shocks are terms of trade shocks (shocks to the price of imports relative to exports, both expressed in domestic currency), then CPI in ‡ation targeting can be destabilizing, because it requires monetary tightening (and thereby currency appreciation) when the price of imports increases, but not when the price of exports increases on world markets, exactly the opposite of the desired pattern of response. That is, the headline CPI in ‡ation rate they target does not exclude terms of trade shocks. For this reason, a nominal anchor that accommodates, rather than exacerbating, the macroeconomic e¤ects of movements in the terms of trade will be a better choice in the case of small countries with exportable and importable goods.
The Data
We use monthly data on monetary policy rates and exchange rates for a large number of emerging market countries and the United States -see International Monetary Fund (2016, Table 2 ) for a classi…cation of exchange rate arrangements and monetary policy frameworks. The United States is used as an indicator of the global economy, because as Kose et al. (2017, p. 1) put it, "developments in the U.S. economy, because of its size and international linkages, are bound to have substantial implications for the global economy. The United States is the world's single largest economy (at market exchange rates), accounting for almost 22 percent of global output and over a third of stock market capitalization. It is prominent in virtually every global market, accounting for about one-tenth of global trade ‡ows, one-…fth of global FDI stock, close to one-…fth of remittances, and one-…fth of global energy demand."
We use the newly constructed monetary policy rate series by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), made publicly available for research on September 2017 -see Bank for International Settlements (2018). Although the data set consists of monetary policy rates for 38 countries, we use the data for six in ‡ation-targeting emerging market countries -Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and South Africa. It is to be noted that the information on monetary policy rates is provided by the national central banks to the Bank for International Settlements, which in turn reports the speci…c interest rate that each national central banks considers as the monetary policy rate. We restrict our analysis to the period after the adoption of in ‡ation targeting in the respective emerging economies (see column 1 in panel A of Table 1 ).
We also use exchange rate data for six exchange-rate targeting emerging market countries -Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Comoros, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro. We obtain the monthly exchange rate series (against the United States dollar) also from the Bank for International Settlements -see Bank for International Settlements (2017). Like the database on policy rates, this newly constructed BIS database contains nominal exchange rate data for 190 countries. Again, we restrict our analysis to the period after the adoption of exchange rate targeting (see column 1 in panel B of Table 1 ).
In ‡ation Rate Targeters
In panel A of Table 1 we list the six emerging market countries that target the in ‡ation rate, together with the year when in ‡ation targeting was adopted (in column 1) and the in ‡ation target range (in column 2). In this regard, after experiencing double-digit in ‡ation, Chile was the …rst among the emerging economies in the world to adopt in ‡ation targeting as the primary monetary strategy in the early 1990s. In September 1999, the central authority o¢ cially adopted full in ‡ation targeting with a ‡oating exchange rate. The objective is to keep the in ‡ation rate based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at 3% with 1 percentage point tolerance level -see the central bank of Chile's website (at http://www.bcentral.cl). Around the same time (in mid-1999), Banco do Brasil, the central bank of Brazil, adopted a full in ‡ation targeting monetary policy strategy after adopting a ‡oating exchange rate earlier in the year. Banco do Brasil targets an annual target of 4:5%, with a tolerance range of 1:5% -see the Banco do Brasil's website (at https://www.bcb.gov.br). After the balance of payments crisis in 1994-1995, known as the Tequila crisis, Banco de Mexico (Mexico's central bank), switched to a free- ‡oating exchange rate regime. In 2001, Banco de Mexico formally adopted an in ‡ation targeting framework. The target in ‡ation rate is 3% with a tolerance range of 1%. A free- ‡oating exchange rate and an in ‡ation target has facilitated to bring the in ‡ation rate down from double digits (an in ‡ation rate of around 50% in late 1995 and early 1996) to less than 5% today -see the Banco de Mexico's website (at http://www.banxico.org.mx/). Banca Nationala a Romaniei, the central bank of Romania, adopted in ‡ation targeting in August 2005. Their primary aim was to bring the annual in ‡ation rate down to single-digit levels. Currently, the central bank of that country targets the annual in ‡ation rate at 3% with the tolerance range being 1% -see the Banca Nationala a Romaniei's website (at http://www.bnr.ro). Also, the National Bank of Serbia manages money and interest rates to keep the medium-term in ‡ation rate within the target tolerance band of 3% ( 1%) and formally adopted direct in ‡ation rate targeting in 2006. The targeted in ‡ation rate, is calculated as an annual percentage change in the CPI. The domestic economy aims to meet nominal, real and structural convergence to the European Union countries through its in ‡ation targeting strategy -see the National Bank of Serbia's website (at https://www.nbs.rs). Finally, the South African Reserve Bank adopted a ‡exible in ‡ation-targeting framework in February 2000 with the in ‡ation target set at a range of 3%-6% annual increase in the headline CPI on a continuous basis. When the in ‡ation targeting framework was …rst adopted, the target was CPIX and not CPI. CPIX is a variation of CPI and consisted of CPI for urban and metropolitan areas and excluded interest rates on mortgage bonds from the calculation. However, over time due to changes in the treatment of housing, interest rates on mortgage bonds were included in the computation -see the South African Reserve Bank's website (at https://www.resbank.co.za).
Exchange Rate Targeters
We list the six emerging economies that target the exchange rate, together with the year when exchange rate targeting was adopted and the exchange rate regime in panel B of Table  1 . The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a …xed exchange rate regime with the motivation to provide monetary, institutional, and political stability in the country in the post-war period. After starting its operation in August 1997, the domestic currency was pegged to the German Deutsche mark, but after the introduction of the euro in January 1999, the currency was pegged to the euro at the same rate as for the Deutsche mark (1:95583 per euro) -see the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina website (at https://www.cbbh.ba) and Kova¼ cević (2003) for more details.
After the hyperin ‡ation episode in late 1996 and early 1997, the Bulgarian National Bank adopted a currency board on July 1, 1997 and managed to bring in ‡ation to single digit levels by mid-1997. At …rst the Bulgarian lev was pegged to the Deutsche mark and then the euro after its introduction in 1999. The Bulgarian National Bank maintains an exchange rate regime which allows the central note-issuing authority to issue its own currency, the Bulgarian lev. The Bulgarian lev is fully backed by euro reserves by the Bulgarian National Bank -see the Bulgarian National Bank's website (http://www.bnb.bg/). With the help of the …xed exchange rate regime, the country has been able to maintain macroeconomic stability despite adverse external shocks such as the Russian …nancial crisis in 1998, the global …nancial crisis in 2007-2009, and the Kosovo con ‡ict.
Since Comoros gained independence, the country has issued its own franc. First, Institut d'Emission des Comores issued domestic franc during the period from 1976 to 1984, then the Banque Centrale des Comores from 1984 to the present. In 1994, the Comoros franc was …xed against the French franc, but after the introduction and subsequent adoption of the euro by France, the Comoros franc was pegged to the euro in 1999 -see the Banque Centrale des Comores's website (at http://www.banque-comores.km) and Lamine (2006) for more details.
After Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, the economy became heavily euroised. The domestic currency, kuna, was …rst pegged to the Deutsche mark during the period from October 1994 to January 1999 and then the euro, after its introduction. The domestic currency can ‡uctuate within a low tolerance range about the target currency. The exchange rate anchor has allowed the country to tackle hyperin ‡ation and provide macroeconomic stability after the war -see the Croatian National Bank's website (at https://www.hnb.hr) and Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 
Unit Root Tests
We start by conducting a battery of unit root and stationary tests in the levels of the policy rates of the countries that have adopted in ‡ation targeting and the logarithms of the exchange rates of the countries that have adopted exchange rate targeting. The sample periods are di¤erent across countries and start when in ‡ation rate targeting was adopted in the case of the in ‡ation-targeting countries (see column 1 of panel A of Table 1 ) and when exchange rate targeting was adopted in the case of the exchange-targeting countries (see column 1 of panel B of Table 1 ).
In particular, we use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test [see Dickey and Fuller (1981) ] assuming both a constant and trend, to test the null hypothesis of a unit root. The optimal lag length is selected using the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). We also conduct Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests [see Phillips and Perron (1988) ]. For both the ADF and PP unit root tests, the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in each of the series cannot be rejected at conventional signi…cance levels. This leads us to the conclusion that all the series representing the levels of the policy rates and the logarithms of the exchange rates of the emerging economies are non-stationary. We also conduct the KPSS test [see Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) ] on the levels of the policy rates and the logarithms of the exchange rates of the emerging economies to test the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root, assuming both a constant and a linear trend. Consistent with our …ndings with the ADF and PP tests, we reject the hypothesis that the time series are stationary at conventional signi…cance levels. These results are not reported but are available upon request.
In Table 2 , we report ADF, PP, and KPSS tests using the …rst level di¤erences of the policy rates of the countries that have adopted in ‡ation targeting (see panel A of Table 2 ) and the logarithmic …rst di¤erences of the exchange rates of the countries that have adopted exchange rate targeting (see panel B of Table 2 ). As can be seen, the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root is rejected at conventional signi…cance levels by both the ADF and PP test statistics in all 13 time series. Results from the KPSS tests on the …rst di¤erences of the policy rates of in ‡ation-targeting economies and the logged …rst di¤erences of the exchange rates of exchange-rate targeting emerging market economies show that the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be rejected at 1% signi…cance level for all 13 series.
Thus, all …rst level di¤erences of the policy rates of the countries that have adopted in- ‡ation targeting (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and South Africa) and the United States are stationary, and all logarithmic …rst di¤erences of the exchange rates of the countries that have adopted exchange rate targeting (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Comoros, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro) are also stationary.
In what follows, we use the stationary series.
The Structural GARCH-in-Mean VAR
We use a bivariate structural VAR model with GARCH-in-Mean errors. More speci…cally, we measure the uncertainty about U.S. monetary policy as the standard deviation of the onestep-ahead forecast error, conditional on the contemporaneous information set. The standard deviation of the one-step-ahead forecast error is a measure of the dispersion in the forecast and hence is a proxy for uncertainty about the impending realization of the U.S. policy rate. Time series, such as policy rates and exchange rates, exhibit di¤erent volatilities and, more importantly, time varying volatilities. Not considering time varying volatilities, will lead to misleading conclusions about the e¤ects of monetary policy changes in the United States on the monetary policy of emerging economies. The bivariate structural GARCH-in-Mean model helps us overcome the limitations of existing studies by accounting for reverse causality as well as volatility in policy rates and exchange rates. The structural model adopted in this paper, allows the conditional variance of one or more variables in a simultaneous equations system to a¤ect the conditional mean of one or more other variables. That is, the model assumes that the conditional variance is heteroscedastic and not homoscedastic as is done in most of the existing studies. The GARCH-in-Mean VAR model analyses the impact of U.S. monetary policy uncertainty on the monetary policy regime of each of the emerging economies through the standard VAR transmission channels and an additional channel, the volatility channel, as it is captured by the GARCH term.
Our model is based on Elder and Serletis (2010), and is a bivariate (identi…ed) structural GARCH-in-Mean, as follows
= 0 0 0 .
In the case of emerging market countries that target the in ‡ation rate, the vector z t includes the change in the monetary policy rate in the United States, f t , and the change in the policy rate of the emerging economy, i t . In the case of those emerging market countries that target the exchange rate, z t includes f t and the logged change in the exchange rate of the emerging economy, log s t . In equation (1), t is the vector of structural disturbances, and it is assumed that t j t 1 iid N (0, H t ) where 0 is the null vector and H t is the covariance matrix, t 1 denotes the information set at time t 1, which includes variables dated t 1 and earlier, and is a matrix of coe¢ cients that relates U.S. monetary policy rate volatility to the conditional mean of the variables in the VAR. This speci…cation allows the matrix of conditional standard deviations, denoted p H t , to a¤ect the conditional mean. Testing whether uncertainty in the U.S. policy rate a¤ects the policy rates of in ‡ation targeting emerging economies and the exchange rates of exchange rate targeting emerging economies is a test of restrictions on the elements of , that relate the conditional standard deviation of U.S. policy rates, given by the appropriate element of p H t , to the conditional mean of the variables in the VAR. The system is identi…ed by assuming that the diagonal elements of contemporaneous correlation matrix, B, are unity, that B is a lower triangular matrix, and that the structural disturbances, t , are contemporaneously uncorrelated.
The conditional variance is modeled as
where diag is the operator that extracts the diagonal elements from a square matrix. We impose the additional restriction that the conditional variance of z t depends only on its own past squared errors and its own past conditional variance such that the matrices F j and G i are also diagonal. Impulse responses are computed as in Elder (2003) . We also show one-standard error bands based on the Monte Carlo method described in Hamilton (1994, p. 337 ). Con…dence intervals are constructed by simulating 1000 impulse responses that are retrieved randomly from the sampling distribution of the maximum likelihood estimates. The covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimates is derived from an estimate of Fisher's information matrix.
Empirical Evidence
Each of the 12 bivariate GARCH-in-Mean VARs, consisting of equations (1) and (2), is estimated by full information maximum likelihood, thus avoiding Pagan's (1984) generated regressor problems associated with estimating the variance function parameters separately from the conditional mean parameters. The procedure is to maximize the log likelihood with respect to the structural parameters -see Elder and Serletis (2010) for more details. We estimate each model after we optimally select p in equation (1) using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and set q = r = 1 in equation (2).
We report the point estimates of the mean and variance function parameters in Tables  3-8 for the emerging countries that target the in ‡ation rate and in Tables 9-14 for those countries that target the exchange rate. The primary coe¢ cient of interest in each of the 12 bivariate structural models is the GARCH-in-Mean coe¢ cient, -the coe¢ cient on the conditional standard deviation of the U.S. monetary policy rate in the mean equation. This coe¢ cient indicates the e¤ect of uncertainty in monetary policy in the United States on the monetary policy stance in each of the emerging market countries. In Table 15 , we report the coe¢ cient of interest and the corresponding p-value for each of the 12 bivariate models we estimate.
We also simulate the response of the monetary policy stance in each of the emerging market countries to both a positive and negative U.S. policy rate shock in order to investigate whether the responses to positive and negative U.S. monetary policy shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. Those impulse responses are shown in Figures 1-6 for the in ‡ation-targeting emerging market countries and in Figures 7-12 for those that target the exchange rate. The impulse responses are based on a U.S. policy rate shock equal to the annualized unconditional standard deviation of the change in the U.S. policy rate and are calculated as in Elder (2003).
In ‡ation Targeters
Regarding countries that target the in ‡ation rate, as can be seen in Tables 3-8 (and the  summary Table 15 ), the estimated coe¢ cient of interest^ is 19:857 with a p-value of 0:000 for Brazil, 3:630 with a p-value of 0:000 for Chile, 0:139 with a p-value of 0:001 for Mexico, 0:357 with a p-value of 0:000 for Romania, 0:714 with a p-value of 0:000 for Serbia, and 0:113 with a p-value of 0:017 for South Africa, respectively. The null hypothesis that the true value of^ is zero is rejected for all countries, indicating that uncertainty in U.S. monetary policy has a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the monetary policy rate in all the in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies in our sample. Speci…cally, monetary policy uncertainty in the United States has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the monetary policy rate in each of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and South Africa.
These results are di¤erent from those reported by Nsafoah and Serletis (2018) for advanced economies; they showed that monetary policy uncertainty in the United States has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the monetary policy rate in each of Canada, Denmark, the Eurozone, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. They are, however, consistent with the …ndings of Canova (2005) who …nds that a contractionary U.S. monetary shock induces a signi…cant and instantaneous increase in Latin American short-term nominal interest rates. Iacoviello and Navarro (2018) also …nd that in emerging economies, policy rates increase in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the United States, and Caceres et al. (2016, p. 31) argue that "the share of sovereign debt in domestic currency that is held by foreigners has been increasing substantially over the last few years, especially in emerging market economies. In this context, portfolio rebalancing by international investors following a rise in U.S. rates can potentially have a larger impact on the capital account. Central banks may then need to raise policy rates in an attempt to attenuate out ‡ow pressures, irrespective of domestic macro conditions."
Next, we simulate the response of policy rates in in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies to both positive and negative U.S. policy rates shocks to investigate whether the responses to positive and negative federal funds rate shocks are asymmetric or symmetric in nature. We also report one-standard error bands based on the Monte Carlo method described in Hamilton (1994, p. 337) . As can be seen in the …rst panel of Figures 1-6 , accounting for the impact of uncertainty in the federal funds rate, a positive shock in the federal funds rate tends to signi…cantly reduce the policy rate immediately in Brazil and Serbia and tends to signi…cantly increase the policy rate immediately in each of Chile, Mexico, Romania, and South Africa. The second panel in Figures 1-6 shows that a negative shock in the U.S. policy rate immediately increases the policy rate in Brazil, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and South Africa while in the case of Chile the policy rate tends to decrease immediately in response to a negative shock in the U.S. policy rate.
It must be noted that in the absence of a formal statistical test of the null hypothesis of symmetric impulse responses, the responses of monetary policy rates in in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies to positive and negative shocks in the U.S. policy rate are not very informative as to whether they are symmetric or not. Finally, in the third panel of Figures  1-6 we compare the response of changes in policy rates of the in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies to a positive shock in the U.S. federal funds rate as estimated in our model to the responses from a model in which the uncertainty in the federal funds rate has been restricted from entering the policy rate equation of the in ‡ation-targeting emerging economy. As can be seen, accounting for uncertainty in the U.S. federal funds rate tends to have an ambiguous e¤ect on the dynamic response of the policy rate in each of the emerging market economies to an unfavorable (positive) shock in the U.S. federal funds rate.
Exchange Rate Targeters
As can be seen in Tables 9-14 (and the summary Table 15 ), the estimated coe¢ cient of interest^ is positive for all six countries. In particular, it is 0:114 with a p-value of 0:000 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 0:141 with a p-value of 0:000 for Bulgaria, 0:035 with a p-value of 0:000 for Comoros, 0:031 with a p-value of 0:000 for Croatia, 0:115 with a p-value of 0:000 for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 0:166 with a p-value of 0:000 for Montenegro. The null hypothesis that the true value of^ is zero is rejected at the 1% level for all countries, indicating the high level of statistical signi…cance of^ in our exchange rate analysis. Thus, higher monetary policy uncertainty in the United States has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the exchange rate of each of the emerging economies in our sample.
Our results are consistent with the …ndings of Tillman (2016) that uncertainty about future U.S. monetary policy leads to a depreciation of local currencies in emerging economies. They are also consistent with Gupta et al. (2017, p. 3) who show that a surprise monetary tightening in the United States, "estimated by an increase in 2-year Treasury yield on the day of the FOMC announcement, results in exchange rate depreciation, decline in equity prices, and increase in bond yields in emerging economies." In this regard, when the domestic currency depreciates, there is a tendency for borrowers (both banks and non…nancial …rms) in emerging market …nancial systems to borrow less in U.S. dollars. In doing so, they assume less risk (since their assets and products are priced in domestic currency), but the domestic depreciation causes a deterioration in …rms'balance sheets, because it increases the domestic currency value of debt denominated in U.S. dollars.
As with the in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies, we simulate the response of exchange rates to both positive and negative federal funds rate shocks. The …rst panel of Figures 7-12 shows that, accounting for the impact of uncertainty in the federal funds rate, a positive shock in the federal funds rate tends to signi…cantly reduce the percentage change in exchange rate, that is leads to an appreciation of the local currency for all six exchange-targeting emerging economies. Our results show that positive (contractionary) monetary policy shocks in the United States lead to appreciation of the currencies of the emerging economies on impact, with the maximum e¤ect during the …rst month, before gradually depreciating to the baseline. That is the U.S. dollar depreciates against the currencies of the emerging economies in response to a contractionary monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve. This is in contradiction to the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model which predicts that a contractionary monetary policy shock, led by a rise in the U.S. nominal rate of interest, should cause an instantaneous appreciation of the U.S. dollar. After the initial instantaneous appreciation, the exchange rate gradually depreciates in line with uncovered interest parity. Bjørnland (2009) …nds empirical support for the Dornbusch (1976) hypothesis in the context of four advanced economies with ‡oating exchange rates, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden. Our results show that the Dornbusch (1976) hypothesis does not hold for the U.S. economy in context of bilateral spot exchange rates of exchange rate targeting emerging economies. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) …nd that contractionary shocks to U.S. monetary policy lead to sharp, persistent appreciation of the U.S. nominal and real exchange rates. We …nd that contractionary shocks to U.S. monetary policy lead to initial sharp depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the currencies of emerging economies, before eventually appreciating to the baseline level. The second panel in Figures 7-12 shows that a negative shock to the federal funds rate tends to signi…cantly increase the exchange rate, leading to a depreciation of the domestic currency in all six emerging economies, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Comoros, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro.
Finally, in the third panel of Figures 7-12 , we compare the response of the exchange rate to a positive shock in the U.S. federal funds rate as estimated in our model to the responses from a model in which = 0. As can be seen, accounting for uncertainty in the U.S. federal funds rate tends to amplify the negative dynamic response of exchange rate changes (i.e. higher appreciation of the domestic currency) to an unfavorable (positive) shock in the U.S. federal funds rate.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate spillovers from monetary policy in the United States to 12 emerging market countries. We make a distinction between two groups of emerging market economies; those that target the in ‡ation rate -Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and South Africa -and those that target the exchange rate -Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Comoros, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro. In doing so, we use the Elder and Serletis (2010) bivariate structural GARCH-in-Mean VAR and two new monthly data sets (compiled by the Bank for International Settlements), one on (central bank) monetary policy rates and the other on exchange rates (against the U.S. dollar).
We …nd statistically signi…cant monetary policy spillovers from the United States to all twelve emerging economies. Some of our …ndings are as follows:
Positive (negative) U.S. monetary policy shocks tend to appreciate (depreciate) the currencies of the exchange rate targeting emerging economies, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the policy rates of the in ‡ation-targeting emerging economies.
Monetary policy uncertainty in the United States leads to an increase in policy rates in those emerging economies that target the in ‡ation rate and leads to depreciation of the currencies of those emerging economies that target the exchange rate.
Accounting for uncertainty in U.S. monetary policy tends to amplify the appreciation of the currencies of those emerging economies that target the exchange rate, but the e¤ect on those emerging economies that target the in ‡ation rate is ambiguous.
In our investigation for monetary policy spillovers from the United States to emerging economies, we assumed that the dynamics of the structural VAR could be summarized by a linear function of the variables of interest and a term related to U.S. monetary policy uncertainty. That is, we ignored those variables that usually enter into a central bank's policy reaction function, such as the in ‡ation gap and the output. Addressing this issue, in the context of a higher-dimensional structural VAR, is an area for future research. 
